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Below is a transcript of the submission.  The full document is available here.

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BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY

 

 

I, Major INQ 2054 will say that:-

 

1.  On 30 January 1972 I was a Captain with 3 Commando Brigade, Air Squadron and I was in command of Kangaw Flight. I was present in Londonderry on that day and was a Helicopter Pilot, flying a helicopter over the city during the afternoon when the march took place.

 

2. Attached to this statement are copies of a number of documents which I have retained during my service career. The originals of these documents will be handed to the Tribunal and I will refer to the attached copies in this statement.

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3. Kangaw Flight was based in Plymouth and was usually involved in carrier-based operations. It was unusual for us to be supporting an Infantry Brigade. However, we received a short notice call to Londonderry to support 8 Brigade. Among the copy documents appended to this statement are a collection of monthly flight reports for various flights including Kangaw Flight. This report was written by me and reports that Kangaw Flight was deployed to Northern Ireland in December 1971 (Appendix 1).

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4. We were based at Ballykelly Barracks, which was given the name, Shackleton Barracks.  Our flight comprised three Sioux helicopters, 4 pilots, as well as observers and ground staff.

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5. While we were based in Londonderry, we had two main tasks to undertake. Our first task was city reconnaissance and this involved us flying over areas of Londonderry and observing barricades. As my monthly report for December 1971 records, various road obstructions were being constructed by the local community in the hostile areas (the Creggan and the Bogside) consisting of burned out vehicles, rubble, iron girders and logs. The location and structure of these barricades changed frequently and aerial observation was the only way to obtain up to the minute intelligence. The Sioux helicopter contained two people, one of them a pilot  and  one of them  an observer.  The observer would be equipped with a large scale road map of the area under observation and a pair of binoculars.

 

6. Reece flights would take place at irregular hours and at a certain minimum altitude.  To begin with, the army squadron standing orders (for 666 Squadron) did not allow our helicopters to be flown at less than 1,500 feet. Among the copy documents appended to this statement is a copy of those standing orders together with a copy of a hostile action report, dated 13 January 1972 (Appendix 2). This hostile action report records that one of our helicopters was hit with a high velocity weapon, probably a rifle. My comments on that hostile action report record that I believed that it was a very lucky shot. However I believe that from then on, we flew at minimum altitude of 2000 feet, and I believe that this was our minimum altitude on 30th January 1972.

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7. Our other main job was to carry out recce flights along the border, and similar altitude restrictions applied to those flights.

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8.  We were obviously given notice of the operation that was being mounted by 8 Brigade on 30 January 1972 and I have kept the Op Order that was drawn up. A copy of that Op Order is attached to this statement and it contains some manuscript notes made by me (Appendix 3). I cannot recall how the Op Order was passed to me, and I cannot recall attending any kind of briefing about the operation that was to be mounted. All I can recall (and this is recorded in the Op Order) is that Kangaw Flight was required to provide aircraft over Londonderry in the afternoon. The  aviation section of the Op Order is dealt with at paragraph 9.j of the Order. This paragraph records that one Sioux is to be available for city recce under Bde HQ Con at Gray 01. Two further Sioux to be in reserve-at Base Loc at 15 mins notice from 301300Z Jan.

 

9. Gray 01 stands for Ebrington Barracks and Base Loe is Ballykelly.

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10. The second part of that paragraph records that an aerial photographic record was to be made of the event, either by cine colour camera or by still camera. I can confirm that Kangaw Flight was not responsible for organising or taking any still or cine photographs that day and I can confirm that no camera of any type was carried  by either of the two helicopters flown over Londonderry by Kangaw  that  afternoon.  I was aware that an Army Air Corps helicopter was flying over Londonderry on that afternoon. I have seen a video copy of cine footage taken from a helicopter and I presume that this footage was taken from the Army Air Corps helicopter.

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11. I did not take the first shift, my colleague, Captain INQ 2088, did. I have made a note on the Ops Order against the Aviation section and that note records that from 13.45 to 16.15 Capt INQ 2088 was providing airborne observation and his passenger was Lieutenant Colonel P M Welsh MC, the CO of 2  Royal Green Jackets.  My note records that I was in the air from 16.15 until 17.45 with an observer, UNK 555.

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12. I also refer to the copy of my Flight Log which is contained within the documents appended to this statement (Appendix 4). That log records two sorties by me on 30 January 1972, one a day sortie and one a night time sortie. The log records that my day sortie lasted for 1.8 hours, whereas my note on the Op Order records the sortie lasted for 1.5 hours. Because filling in the flight log was a mandatory requirement and had to be done accurately, I believe that my flight log is more likely to be accurate in this respect.

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13. The night sortie referred to in the flight log refers to a short flight (recorded as 18 minutes). I can remember travelling to Ebrington Barracks to transport a Colonel from the MOD. I cannot recall whether I was dropping him off at Ebrington Barracks or picking him up to transfer him somewhere else.

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14. Our call sign was 61 Delta. Captain INQ 2088's call sign was 61 Yankee. Radio transmissions to and from our respective helicopters are recorded as such in the Brigade Log, a copy of which I have seen in preparation for giving this statement. I have also heard a tape made, I understand, by Mr Porter, and have seen a copy of a transcript of that tape (Appendix 5). My first appearance in the Brigade Log is at Serial 403, some time between 16.17 and 16.18. The message is "This is 61 Delta arriving in your location in 5 minutes to relieve call sign 61 Yankee. Over".

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15.  I would have been relieving 61 Yankee because 61 Yankee was probably low on fuel. Unless flying at speed or carrying an unusually heavy load, the Sioux helicopter had an endurance of around 2 ½ hours. Having been aware of the time that 61 Yankee started its flight, I would have been aware that they would have needed to have been relieved at around this time and I do not think that it would be necessary for them to radio in and call for relief. I would not have been briefed about what had been happening during Captain INQ 208's flight, I would have picked up anything of note from the Brigade net. I do not recall receiving any specific order to take off, but I presume that an order was given,-probably by land line.

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16. I now have a very poor memory of what actually occurred during the 1½ hours that I spent in the air over Londonderry that afternoon. With me in the helicopter was Corporal UNK 555 who, as I have said, was equipped with a large scale road map and a pair of binoculars. Without binoculars I would not have been able to see much detail of what was going on on the ground and although the visibility from the Sioux was very good. I would have been more concerned with flying the helicopter and leaving Corporal UNK. 555 to do the observing. If he observed anything of note, he would report it to me over the intercom, giving an exact location or grid reference from the road map that he had. I would then radio the information back on the brigade net and these radio transmissions are recorded on the brigade log and on Mr Porter's tape. Having listened to the tape, I have been prompted to remember seeing the movement of troops on the ground and build up of civilians but apart from that there are no specific incidents that now stick out in my memory. In so far as hearing anything was concerned, this was impossible. The noise inside the helicopter was deafening and UNK 555 and I could only communicate using an intercom. I certainly would not have been able to hear shooting from the ground although I might have been able to see muzzle flashes of weapons being fired.  If we had seen muzzle flashes we would not have reported this over the brigade net  because the soldiers on the ground would have been well aware that firing was taking place. We would have reported it if the firing had been directed at us.

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17. We had no command authority and no initiative to take any independent action so our role on the afternoon was merely to observe. If we had been asked to observe a particular area, we would have done so but the radio log records that this did not happen on that afternoon. We would have been flying slow orbits at 2000 feet.

 

18. Our helicopters all had four radio links. These were the brigade link, a Pye Westminster radio (a civilian set to the RUC), a civilian air traffic control net and  a UHF net. The UHF net was a military radio that was not regularly used in Northern Ireland, it was intended for use for RAF airfields. As far as I recall, all  our transmissions that afternoon were on the brigade net.

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19.  I now refer to the various entries set out in the transcript of Mr Porter's tape of brigade net transmissions that afternoon. As I say, my first appearance is at Serial 403 when I report that I would be in location in 5 minutes to relieve call sign 61 Yankee. The Sioux flew at a mile a minute and this accords with the time needed to fly from Ballykelly. At Serial 430, I report to all stations that I was in position. I then appear at various places such as Serial 435 when I am asked to try and pick up and follow an ambulance. At 466 I report that the ambulance was at the City Wall at the checkpoint at Castle Gate. At Serial 475 appears a message from me that "there is a red and white xxx at your location at the same height. I am investigating. Out." I have no idea what the red and white object might be. I have listened to the Porter tape to try and identify what I might have been referring to, but it is not clear at all.

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20.  At Serial 484 I report a large crowd of about 50 or 60 circling around what I presume to be a body at grid reference 43141684 and at Serial 502 I report that there are now two ambulances, one stationary in Rossville Street by the Rossville Flats area and one dealing with the body which I had just referred to. Again, I have no memory now of these events. I report that the ambulance had left the Rossville Flats area and was proceeding along Great James Street towards the Strand Road at Serial 516.

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21.  Serial 533 records that another ambulance had arrived at the Rossville Flats with a crowd of about 50 or 60 and Serial 554 records that there was  a stationary ambulance in the Creggan at the junction of Dunree Gardens and Fanad Drive. Again, I have no memory now of these events. There are other entries of a similar nature, and then there is an entry at Serial 577 where I report seeing three muzzle flashes fired from the area of the ambulance at Eglington Place. I presume that UNK 555 would have identified this location on his map.

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22.  Apart from other reports about ambulances, there was nothing of note in the Brigade Log from me until Serial 628 when I am ordered  to return to my base location.  This is at some time between 17.37 and 17.42.

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23.  I can confirm that it is unlikely that I would have seen any of these events myself.  I was concentrating on flying the helicopter while UNK 555 observed with his binoculars. At the time that I was called back to base it was getting rather dark for visual observation. Serial 626 records my message to this effect. I then refer to a nightsun capability. The nightsun was a large spotlight with a very powerful beam, capable of being either focused or widened. It was a very effective piece of kit.

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24.  As far as the rest of the day was concerned, my flight log records that I made one further short night time flight, which I have already mentioned. Apart from that, I have no memories of the rest of the day at all. I presume that I would have learnt of the scale and seriousness of the events in Londonderry either that night or the following morning by reading sitreps and also reading newspapers and listening to the radio.

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25.  Apart from the sitrep, the rest of the documents appended to this statement have no direct relevance to the events of 10 January 1972 but I have included them in case they can be of any background interest. Although my monthly report for January 1972 is included within these documents (Appendix 1), it was prepared by me before the month end and therefore it does not refer to the events of the day in question. Unfortunately, I have not retained a copy of  the military report for February 1972 and I cannot recall what it may have said. I have also included a copy-of a sitrep dated 4-5 January, which shows the sort of day to day activities being carried out (Appendix 6).

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26.  I was written to on 14 December 1972 by the MOD (Appendix 7) who were writing an official history of Northern Ireland for the Army Department. They wrote to me in the hope that it was our flight that was responsible for taking photographs. Both the hand-written draft of my response and a copy of the actual typed letter are included with the copy documents (Appendices 8 and 9). I have also attached a copy of my letter dated 18 February 1972, to the Brigade Major of 3rd Commando Brigade (Appendix 10). I sent him a copy of the Ops Order and confirmed Kangaw Flight were in support of the operation. A copy of the Brigade  Major's short response is also attached (Appendix 11). The other documents (Appendices 12-17)  consist of daily routine orders and standing orders and lists of personnel  which may or may not
be of any use. Coincidentally, I have also found a record that one of our ground support, UNK 556, was in Altnagelvin Hospital at the time of Bloody Sunday. I believe he had had a motoring accident Appendices 15 and 16).

 

27. I have also included a copy of a large map of Londonderry, divided into sectors and showing which Battalions were responsible for each sector. Finally, I have some documents relating to personnel and R & R leave, which may help to establish who was present at Ballykelly on the day in question (Appendices 17 and 18).

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28. I can confirm that I have made no other statements about the events of  30 January 1972.

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Signed   ..............................

               Major INQ 2054

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Dated    17th May 2000

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